Summary: Being and Nothingness

Sartre begins by highlighting a key contribution of phenomenology: by reducing what exists to the series of appearances through which it manifests itself ¹, phenomenology eliminates the dualities that have long troubled philosophy (being/appearance, thing-in-itself/phenomenon, interior/exterior, subject/object). These are replaced by the monism of the phenomenon.

In this framework, all appearances are of equal value. For instance, force is understood as nothing other than the totality of its effects. As a result, the dualism between being and appearing can no longer be sustained in philosophy. Appearance refers not to a concealed reality but to the entire series of appearances ².

Similarly, the dualism of power and act is abolished: Everything is actual ³. For example, Proust’s genius lies entirely in his work, not in any supposed potential to produce works.

The starting point of Being and Nothingness is precisely this question: What is the being of this appearance, once appearance is no longer seen as distinct from, or opposed to, being itself? Or, more simply: What is being?

The being of the phenomenon cannot be reduced to the phenomenal; it is transphenomenal. This poses a genuine philosophical question. How can it be answered?

To address this, Sartre turns to consciousness. Sartre defines consciousness as the transphenomenal dimension of the subject's being — not a particular mode of knowledge ⁴. Understanding consciousness in this way is therefore essential to understanding being itself, which is equally transphenomenal.

This raises the question: What is consciousness?

Sartre draws on Husserl's fundamental insight:

All consciousness, as Husserl demonstrated, is consciousness of something. In other words, there is no consciousness that does not posit a transcendent object. This means that consciousness itself has no content ⁵.

For instance, a table is not contained within consciousness, even as a representation. A table exists in space, next to the window ⁶.

The first task of philosophy, then, is to expel things from consciousness and restore the true relationship between consciousness and the world: Consciousness transcends itself to reach an object ⁷. For this reason, Sartre’s philosophy cannot be described as idealism. If all consciousness is consciousness of something, then subjectivity does not constitute the objective world. To be conscious of something is to confront a concrete, irreducible presence that is not itself consciousness ⁸. This is why pure subjectivity would dissolve into nothingness ⁹.

From this perspective, as Heidegger observed, we possess a pre-ontological, immediate understanding of being. The phenomenon of being, like any primary phenomenon, is directly revealed to consciousness ¹⁰.

However, the phenomenon of being must be analysed to clarify its meaning.

Sartre introduces a crucial distinction, asserting that being is divided into two distinct and separate regions ¹¹: being-in-itself and being-for-itself.

Being-in-itself refers to the mode of being of things, which simply exist without any self-reflection—in other words, without consciousness. Being is not a relation to itself; it simply is. It is a presence that cannot assert itself, as it is entirely self-contained. We can summarise this by stating that being is in itself, meaning it does not refer back to itself as consciousness. It merely is. ¹². This mode of being adheres to the principle of identity: Being is what it is ¹³. For instance, a door is a door, and nothing more.

Being-for-itself, on the other hand, characterises the mode of being of humans, as they possess consciousness. Through self-reflection, humans define themselves as being what they are not and not being what they are ¹⁴. By becoming aware of themselves, they introduce a gap within themselves. They are thus split — at once the observer and the observed.

¹ L’Etre et le Néant, Gallimard, Paris, 1943, Introduction, I, p.11
² ibid.
³ ibid, III, p.17
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ ibid., p.18
⁸ ibid, V, p.27
⁹ ibid., p.28
¹⁰ ibid, VI, p.30
¹¹ ibid.
¹² ibid., p.32
¹³ ibid.
¹⁴ ibid.