Summary: The Imaginary

Sartre sets out the problematic of the book at the outset: The purpose of this work is to describe the great "unrealizing" function of consciousness or imagination, and its noematic correlative, the imaginary ¹.

I/ The certain

Seizing the image as image is only possible through a reflexive act, of the 2^nd degree.

Since Descartes we have known that a reflexive consciousness delivers to us absolutely certain data ². Thus the man who in an act of reflection becomes aware of "having an image" cannot be mistaken ³.

So why is there disagreement among psychologists? Because they seek the nature of the image by induction. This can only lead to the formulation of probable hypotheses.

It is better to describe the image by reflection: One thing is the description of the image, another thing are the inductions touching its nature. In passing from one to the other we go from the certain to the probable. ⁴

Sartre thus proposes a phenomenology of the image: Produce images in us, reflect on these images, describe them ⁵.

The error is to think that the image is in consciousness and that the object of the image is in the image ⁶.

This error comes from our habit of thinking in space and in terms of space. Sartre calls this error Illusion of immanence ⁷.

A prime example of this type of error in the history of philosophy is Hume's definition of idea: By idea I mean the faint images of perceptions in thought ⁸.

In this erroneous perspective, to have an idea of a chair is to have a chair in consciousness ⁹. This error is taken up by psychology, philosophy and common sense alike. I have an image of Peter would mean: I have a certain portrait of Peter in consciousness. Thus an image is implicitly equated with the material object it represents ¹⁰.

Or what does reflection teach us?

When I perceive a chair, it would be absurd to say that the chair is in my perception [...] My perception is a certain consciousness, and the chair is the object of that consciousness [...] In reality, whether I perceive or imagine this straw chair on which I am sitting, it always remains outside consciousness; it is there, in space, in this room, facing the desk ¹¹.

Consciousness relates to the chair in two different ways, depending on whether it is imagination or perception: The word ‘image’ can therefore only designate the relation of consciousness to the object; in other words, it is a certain way that the object appears to consciousness, or a certain way that consciousness gives itself an object ¹².

Instead of mental image it would therefore be better to say imaging consciousness of Peter ¹³.

An image is nothing but a relationship [...] Pierre is directly affected, my attention is not directed to an image but to an object ¹⁴.

We thought we were dealing with images, i.e. elements of consciousness. We now see that we are dealing with complete consciousnesses, i.e. complex structures that aim at certain objects ¹⁵.

This is the difference between image, concept, and perception: These are the three types of consciousness by which the same object can be given to us ¹⁶.

Sartre devotes a long moment to showing how they are distinguished.

In perception, the object is only ever given to me from one side at a time ¹⁷.

Sartre takes the famous example of the cube:

There always remains a possibility that the first face of the cube will have annihilated itself during my change of position. The existence of the cube will therefore remain doubtful ¹⁸.

At the same time, according to my point of view, the square can appear round: Objects must be learned, that is, the possible points of view on them must be multiplied. The object itself is the synthesis of all these apparitions ¹⁹.

¹ L’Imaginaire, Gallimard, Folio, Paris, 1986 1ère partie, p.13
² I, 1, p.15
³ ibid.
⁴ ibid., p.16
⁵ ibid., p.17
⁶ I, 2, p.17
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid., p.18
⁹ ibid.
¹⁰ ibid., p.19
¹¹ ibid., p.20
¹² ibid., p.21
¹³ ibid.
¹⁴ ibid., p.22
¹⁵ ibid.
¹⁶ I, 3, p.23
¹⁷ ibid.
¹⁸ ibid.
¹⁹ ibid.