Summary: The Imaginary
The Imaginary was published in 1940. Sartre develops a phenomenology of the imagination, drawing on Husserl and borrowing the famous notion of intentionality of consciousness. He examines the essential characteristics of the image, contrasting it with concepts and perception, and shows that imagination is a manifestation of human freedom.
Other works: Existentialism Is a Humanism Being and Nothingness
Sartre sets out the central question of the book at the outset: The purpose of this work is to describe the great negating function of consciousness—that is, imagination—and its noematic correlate: the imaginary.
1.
I/ The Certain
Apprehending the image as an image is only possible through a second-degree reflexive act.
Since Descartes, it has been established that a reflexive consciousness provides us with absolutely certain data
2. Thus, anyone who, through an act of reflection, becomes aware of possessing an image in consciousness cannot be wrong about it
3.
Why, then, is there disagreement among psychologists? Because they seek to determine the nature of the image through inductive reasoning. This can only result in the formulation of probable hypotheses.
It is better to describe the image through reflection: One thing is the description of the image; another is the inductive inferences about its nature. Moving from one to the other, we shift from certainty to probability.
4
Sartre thus proposes a phenomenology of the image: to generate images within ourselves, reflect on them, and describe them.
5.
The mistake lies in thinking that the image resides within consciousness and that the object of the image is contained within the image itself
6.
This mistake arises from our habit of thinking spatially and in terms of space. Sartre calls this mistake the illusion of immanence
7.
A prime example of this type of error in the history of philosophy is Hume's definition of the idea: By “idea” I mean the faint images of perceptions in thought
8.
From this mistaken perspective, to have an idea of a chair is to possess a chair within consciousness
9. This mistake is perpetuated by psychology, philosophy, and common sense alike. To say ‘I have an image of Peter’ would mean: ‘I have a certain portrait of Peter within consciousness.’ Thus, an image is implicitly identified with the material object it represents
10.
But what does reflection teach us?
When I perceive a chair, it would be absurd to say that the chair is in my perception. [...] My perception is a certain consciousness, and the chair is the object of that consciousness. [...] In reality, whether I perceive or imagine this straw chair on which I am sitting, it remains outside consciousness in all cases; it is there, in space, in this room, positioned in front of the desk 11.
Consciousness engages with the chair in two different ways, depending on whether it is an act of imagination or of perception. The word ‘image’ can therefore refer only to the relation of consciousness to the object; in other words, it is a particular manner in which the object appears to consciousness or in which consciousness constitutes its object
12.
Instead of a mental image
, it would therefore be better to speak of an imaging consciousness of Peter
13.
An image is nothing more than a relation. [...] Pierre is directly engaged; my attention is not directed toward an image but toward an object
14.
We thought we were dealing with images, that is, elements of consciousness. We now see that we are dealing with fully formed acts of consciousness, that is, complex structures that are directed toward specific objects
15.
This distinction concerns image, concept, and perception. These constitute the three types of consciousness through which the same object can be presented to us
16.
Sartre devotes considerable attention to showing how they are distinguished.
In perception, the object is always presented to me from only one side at a time
17.
Sartre gives the famous example of the cube:
There is always the possibility that the first face of the cube may have ceased to exist during my change of position. The existence of the cube thus remains uncertain 18.
At the same time, from my perspective, a square may appear round from a certain angle: Objects must be understood; that is, one must multiply the possible perspectives on them. The object itself is constituted by the synthesis of all these appearances
19.
1 L’Imaginaire, Gallimard, Folio, Paris, 1986 1ère partie, p.13
2 I, 1, p.15
3 ibid.
4 ibid., p.16
5 ibid., p.17
6 I, 2, p.17
7 ibid.
8 ibid., p.18
9 ibid.
10 ibid., p.19
11 ibid., p.20
12 ibid., p.21
13 ibid.
14 ibid., p.22
15 ibid.
16 I, 3, p.23
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.