Summary: Existentialism Is a Humanism
Published in 1946, this work by Sartre aims to clarify the meaning of existentialism in an accessible and educational manner. It is a transcript of a lecture he delivered in Paris the previous year. Sartre himself regarded it as no more than a straightforward introduction to his philosophy.
Other works: Being and Nothingness The Imaginary
Sartre outlines the criticisms levelled at the philosophical movement he helped to initiate—existentialism: quietism (the futility of action), pessimism, and individualism. In response, he seeks to demonstrate that existentialism is, in fact, a form of humanism.
Two types of existentialism can be distinguished: Christian existentialism (Jaspers, G. Marcel) and atheistic existentialism (Heidegger, Sartre). What unites these diverse approaches is a shared conviction that human beings are defined by the principle that existence precedes essence.
This means that there is no pre-established concept of humanity to which I must conform. I am free to become whatever I choose; throughout my life, I will determine what I am, and at any moment I can become something other than what I am right now.
Man is nothing at first. He only comes to be afterwards, and he will be as he has made himself
1. Hence the first principle of existentialism: Man is nothing other than what he makes of himself
2.
For objects, the reverse is true. Sartre illustrates this with the example of a letter opener: the concept of a letter opener defines a specific use, a precise function for the object. This is its essence—what it is. This essence precedes its existence: the object is made, brought into being to serve this function, and it does not evolve.
If man is nothing other than what he makes of himself, then he bears full responsibility for what he is. Moreover, he bears responsibility not just for himself but for all of humanity. To make a choice is implicitly to affirm that what is chosen has value—and not just for oneself, but for everyone: In choosing myself, I choose everyone
3. Our responsibility is therefore absolute, and this generates anguish within us.
Sartrean existentialism takes as its starting point the premise that God does not exist. There is consequently no human nature, no moral standards, no inherent good or evil—no supreme intellect that could have established such notions. It is up to each of us to determine what is right, what is wrong, and what a human being should be.
"If God did not exist, everything would be permissible," says Dostoevsky; this is the starting point of existentialism 4.
Or, as Sartre puts it: We are alone, without excuses. This is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free
5.
Sartre offers an example to illustrate the idea that man is condemned, at every moment, to invent himself
6. He presents a dilemma: should I abandon my sick mother and join the Resistance? Nothing can guide me—Christian or Kantian morality is too abstract and vague to provide an answer. The only solution is to make a decision and take full responsibility for it.
This is why existentialism is not a form of quietism: far from paralysing action, it demands commitment. Man has reality only through his actions—he is nothing other than the sum of his actions, his life. This is not a particularly comforting doctrine for those who feel they have failed, since the failure is theirs alone.
Nor is it a pessimistic doctrine, since man's destiny lies within himself
7. He is a free consciousness, not a thing—as in materialism, which reduces him to a mere object among others, determined by economic forces.
Existentialism is not individualism either. It simply begins with the truth of the cogito—Descartes' "I think, therefore I am"—because this is a proposition we can be certain of. Yet the cogito encompasses not only the experience of consciousness grasping itself but also the recognition of other consciousnesses. In existentialism, man is not enclosed within his own subjectivity but placed within a world of intersubjectivity.
1 L’existentialisme est un humanisme, Gallimard, Folio, Paris, 2010, p.29
2 p.30
3 p.33
4 p.39
5 ibid.
6 p.40
7 p.56
