Summary: Being and Nothingness (page 2)
Having explored the nature of being, we can now turn to its opposite: nothingness — as the title of the book itself suggests. This may, in turn, shed new light on being itself.
Part I: The Problem of Nothingness
We must not, as Descartes does with the soul and the body, separate the two terms of a relationship only to struggle to reunite them afterwards
1. Doing so results in an abstraction—a kind of fiction—and therefore an error, as it isolates what is not meant to exist independently
2, as per Laporte's well-known definition of abstraction.
For instance, separating the phenomenon from consciousness is itself an abstraction, as they are intrinsically linked. What is truly concrete is the human being in the world, a particular unity that Heidegger famously describes as "being-in-the-world."
3.
The focus shifts to the human being's relationship with the world.
Sartre begins with a simple observation: to study the human being's relationship to the world is already to adopt an interrogative stance toward being — to ask a question.
And a question, fundamentally, is a form of expectation: I expect an answer from the being I am questioning. However, every question allows for the possibility of a negative answer
4.
This reveals that we are surrounded by nothingness. Nothingness is the constant possibility of non-being, both outside us and within us, and it is this possibility that enables us to question being
5. Thus, a new component of reality emerges before us: non-being
6.
Let us now explore the relationship between being and non-being.
It is through the human being that non-being arises: Non-being always emerges within the bounds of human expectation. For instance, it is because I expect to find 1500 francs that I find only 1300 instead
7. Not all questions are directed at a person: If my car breaks down, I question the carburettor or the spark plugs
8.
When I expect a revelation of being, I simultaneously prepare for the possibility of non-being. If I question the carburettor, it is because I acknowledge the possibility that there may be nothing in it. Thus, my question inherently includes a prior understanding of non-being. This act of questioning is, in itself, a relationship between being and non-being.
9.
It is therefore through human existence that nothingness enters the world. This occurs not only through the act of questioning but also through perception and judgment.
As Sartre reminds us, perception always involves the formation of a figure against a background
10. The recession of background forms is the necessary condition for the primary figure to appear.
Similarly, the judgement of negation is inherently tied to non-being: For it to be possible to say ‘no’, non-being must be a perpetual presence both within and beyond us. In this way, nothingness haunts being
11.
Sartre observes that being is not merely one structure among others, nor merely one aspect of the object. Rather, it is the very condition for all structures and all moments
12.
This is crucial:
Nothingness haunts being. This implies that being has no need for nothingness to define or conceive of itself. One can scrutinise the notion of being thoroughly without discovering the slightest trace of nothingness within it. However, the reverse is not true: nothingness, which has no independent existence, can only derive its being from being. The nothingness of being arises solely within the bounds of being. If being were to disappear entirely, it would not result in the triumph of non-being; instead, nothingness itself would vanish along with it. Nothingness exists only as a phenomenon on the surface of being13.
In other words, being is prior to nothingness and serves as its foundation
14.
Heidegger avoids falling into Hegel's error of granting non-being a form of existence, even an abstract one. For Heidegger, nothingness is not; it is pure negation.
1 Part I, chapter I, 1, p. 37
2 ibid.
3 ibid., p.38
4 ibid., p.39
5 ibid.
6 ibid., p.40
7 I, 2, p.41
8 ibid.
9 ibid., p.42
10 ibid., p.44
11 ibid., p.46
12 I, 3, p.48
13 ibid., p.51
14 ibid., p.50
