Summary: Being and Nothingness (page 7)

Neither idealism nor realism can resolve the paradox of proving that others exist as genuine subjects. This impasse has led some to fall into solipsism—the belief that others do not exist and that one is alone in the world.

Philosophers like Husserl have attempted to establish the reality of others by arguing that others are an indispensable condition for the construction of a shared world. However, Husserl only succeeded in demonstrating the parallelism of empirical egos, which no one disputes, rather than the reality of transcendental subjects.

In this sense, the Other is never merely the empirical individual I encounter in experience; rather, it is the transcendental subject to which that individual necessarily points ¹.

Sartre also recognises the contributions of thinkers like Hegel and Heidegger, while identifying the limitations of their approaches.

Sartre contends that we encounter the Other rather than constructing them. But how is the Other encountered? How does the Other present themselves as a subject?

Sartre begins with a straightforward example, adopting his characteristic first person: I see a man on a lawn. Yet the relationship between this man and the lawn eludes me:

The distance that unfolds between the man and the lawn is a negation of the distance I establish between these two objects. It appears as a disruption of the relations I perceive among the objects in my world. This disruption resembles a background to things that remains beyond my grasp, a perspective conferred upon them from outside ³.

The Other thus emerges in my experience as an element of disintegration within my universe ⁴. We encounter the Other as a subject (for-itself) when one perceives the constant flight of things towards a point that eludes me, as it turns upon itself and establishes its own distances ⁵. At this moment, the world appears as if pierced by a void—a hollow in the midst of its being. ⁶.

How, then, does the Other reveal themselves to me as a subject? This disintegration of the world exposes the fact that one is an object for the Other. And from the moment the Other perceives one as an object, they reveal themselves to be, likewise, a subject: It is through the revelation of my being-an-object for the Other that I am able to grasp the presence of their being-a-subject. ⁷.

The gaze is the primary means by which the Other apprehends one as an object—and in doing so, reveals themselves as a subject.

The Other is never given to me as an object through their gaze: The objectification of the Other would cause their gaze to collapse entirely ⁸. On the contrary, the Other is revealed as a pure subject ⁹.

The error of solipsism and earlier doctrines concerning the Other lies in assuming that the Other is first given to me as an object. From this premise, it becomes impossible to prove their nature as a subject, leading to a retreat into solipsism.

'Being-for-others' is nothing other than the 'self-as-object.' It is through the Other that my self as object is revealed to me ¹⁰.

Shame arises as the feeling of being an object for the Other—a fundamental awareness of finding one's being externalised, engaged in another’s being, and illuminated by a pure subject ¹¹.

This gives rise to the following situation:

The Other looks at me and, in doing so, holds the secret of my being. The Other knows what I am, meaning the profound essence of my being exists outside me, held captive in the Other's absence. The Other wields power over me ¹².

Faced with this, one can adopt two distinct attitudes:

1. The First Attitude: Love

In Sartre's words: Through the gaze, I am possessed by the Other. Their gaze shapes my body in its nakedness, brings it into being, and constitutes it in a way I can never directly perceive. The Other holds a secret—the secret of what I am. They make me exist and, in doing so, possess me. Others, for me, are both what has robbed me of my being and what makes my being possible.¹³.

¹ I, 3, p.273
² ibid., p.289
³ I, 4, p.294
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid., p.295
⁷ ibid., p.296
⁸ ibid., p.307
⁹ ibid., p.310
¹⁰ ibid.
¹¹ ibid., p.328
¹² ibid., III, p.403
¹³ III, 1, p.403