Summary: Ethics (page 9)

One solution is for men to renounce their natural right and agree together not to harm one another by entering into society.

Since an affect can only be countered by a stronger affect, one affect—such as the desire to rob someone—will be resisted by another affect, namely the fear of greater harm, in this case, punishment by society.

It is important to recall that Part IV is devoted to explaining the reasons for human servitude—man being subject to the power of the affects. Yet, even in this part, Spinoza introduces the means by which we can achieve freedom: by resisting the power of the affects.

It is enough to harness the very power of the affects by turning some of them against others, allowing them to neutralise each other.

Spinoza presents a second path to liberation: For all the actions to which we are determined by an affect that is a passion, we can also be determined without it—by reason ¹.

Our reason is capable of generating certain desires within us, and these desires, insofar as they arise from reason, will lead us to pursue what is best for us—that is, what is adequately conceived by man’s essence alone ². Indeed, a desire that is born of reason cannot be excessive ³.

We can therefore liberate ourselves from the affects by creating, through reason, others that are more suitable or more beneficial.

Fear is not one of the reasonable affects: Whoever is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil is not led by reason ⁴.

To act according to reason is to act out of joy or desire. It is the superstitious who attempt to restrain evil through fear of death. Thus, the wise man is one who has overcome this fear of death and does not even concern himself with it:

The free man thinks of nothing less than death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death, but on life ⁵.

Ultimately, we must bear with equanimity whatever befalls us—including sorrowful events that we could not avoid due to the limits of our power: Man's power is extremely limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes ⁶. This final point bears a strong resemblance to Stoicism: accepting events as they come, without yielding to negative passions such as sadness, fear, or envy.

Part V: On the Power of the Intellect, in Other Words, Human Freedom

This part of the Ethics is devoted to its second major theme: the path that leads to freedom ⁷.

Spinoza has demonstrated the power of the affects—unlike the Stoics, he does not believe that we have absolute control over them: We do not hold absolute dominion over our affects ⁸.

He also criticises Descartes’ theory of the pineal gland and animal spirits, as developed in The Passions of the Soul. Thus, true human freedom does not lie in Cartesian free will.

Instead, we must seek elsewhere for the means by which we can liberate ourselves from the power of the affects.

First, every affect is always linked to the idea of an external cause. If, therefore, we succeed in removing from our minds the idea of this external cause, we free ourselves from the affect associated with it: If we take away an emotion from the soul—in other words, an affect from the thought of an external cause—and connect it to other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards that external cause, as well as the fluctuations of the soul arising from these affects, will be destroyed ⁹.

Since love or hatred arise from joy or sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause, it is enough to cease thinking about this external cause—whether it be a beloved person in the case of unrequited love, or someone we hate—for these negative passions to lose their hold over us.

¹ IV, prop. 59
² IV, prop. 61, demonstration
³ IV, prop. 61
⁴ IV, prop. 63
⁵ IV, prop. 67
⁶ IV, appendix, chap.32
⁷ V, preface
⁸ ibid.
⁹ V, prop. 2