Summary: Ethics (page 3)

It is worth noting that certain aspects of Spinoza's thought resemble Stoicism—such as determinism, the perfection of the world, and the identification of nature with God. Indeed, some passages of his work could almost be mistaken for lines from Marcus Aurelius' Meditations.

However, the similarities end there. Spinoza's philosophy diverges radically from Stoicism on all other points. His system possesses an originality and coherence entirely its own.

In the famous appendix to Book I, Spinoza emphasises the importance of combating prejudices. These prejudices take the form of superstitions propagated by religion, the foremost being finalism—the belief that man is the ultimate purpose of Creation, or that God created everything for man's sake, with his happiness in mind.

This idea is itself rooted in another fundamental illusion: man believes himself to be free simply because he is conscious of his own will and desires. Yet he is unaware of the causes that necessarily determine him to will or desire as he does. In reality, his so-called free will is an illusion—he is not truly free:

Men think themselves free because they are conscious of their volitions and appetites, yet they are ignorant of the causes that determine them to will and desire. They do not even conceive of these causes, not even in their dreams ¹.

The notion that the gods created everything for mankind so that men would honour them, and that the more one honours them, the greater the divine rewards—including the promise of eternal life—is nothing but superstition. It is easy to see why Spinoza was excommunicated by his Jewish contemporaries in Amsterdam, even though the Ethics never appeared during his lifetime.

In reality, for Spinoza, it is finalism—as found in Judeo-Christian thought—that is truly impious: This doctrine diminishes God's perfection; for if God acts for the sake of an end, then he necessarily desires something he lacks ².

Since men believe that things exist for their sake, they have fabricated certain notions (or fictions): Good and evil, order and confusion, heat and cold, beauty and ugliness. And since they believe themselves to be free, they also conceive of praise and blame, sin and merit ³.

In reality, none of this exists in itself. These notions make sense only in relation to us, but correspond to no objective reality. There are no intrinsically good or bad actions—only actions that necessarily occur, arising from the infinite divine substance. Some of these actions are beneficial to us, while others are harmful.

Similarly, men call "order" whatever is easy for them to conceive, as if order were something that existed in nature independently of human imagination ⁴.

A final example: If the movement transmitted to the nerves by objects perceived through the eyes contributes to health, then the objects that produce this effect are called "beautiful," whereas those that provoke an opposite reaction are deemed "ugly." ⁵.

To sum up: Each person has judged things according to the disposition of his brain and has mistaken the affections of his imagination for the nature of things ⁶.

As a result, the world is perfect, and the fact that certain things or events are harmful to men does not diminish its perfection.

Part II: Of the Spirit

Once again, Spinoza begins by establishing definitions and axioms.

One notable definition is his conception of the body: By body, I mean a mode that expresses, in a precise and determinate manner, the essence of God insofar as it is considered as an extended thing ⁷.

This definition is inspired by Descartes' conception of the body as an extended thing, as found in the Meditations on First Philosophy, where it is contrasted with the mind, conceived as a thinking thing. However, in Spinoza's system, both attributes—thought and extension—belong to God, or Nature: Thinking is an attribute of God; in other words, God is a thinking thing. ⁸ Extension is an attribute of God; in other words, God is an extended thing ⁹.

¹ Part I, appendix
² ibid.
³ ibid.
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ Part II, definition 1
⁸ II, prop. 1
⁹ II, prop. 2