the French flag
book cover

Summary: Ethics

Spinoza's Ethics was not published during his lifetime to avoid censorship; it only appeared posthumously in 1677. In fact, the book was banned the following year. In it, he develops his ideas in the manner of a mathematician, structuring them as a series of propositions rigorously deduced from one another. He successively examines God, freedom, and the passions to establish a new definition of the wise man.



Part I: On God

In the Ethics, Spinoza, fascinated by the rigour and clarity of the mathematical model, sets himself the goal of applying the geometrical method to philosophy.

This method proceeds by definitions and axioms, then moves from proposition to proposition, each rigorously deduced from the last, until it reaches the truth to be demonstrated.


The purpose of definitions is to fix precisely the meaning of the terms to be used, leaving no room for ambiguity or equivocation.

Axioms state truths considered self-evident, which serve as the basis for demonstrations. They are more than mere definitions, in that they do not simply determine the meaning of a word: they are genuine predicative judgements that say something about something and claim the status of self-evident truth.


Let us take a few examples of definitions and axioms proposed by Spinoza.

Among the definitions, we find in Book I the famous one of the cause of itself (causa sui): By cause of itself, I mean that whose essence envelops existence, in other words that whose nature can only be conceived of as existing 1.

Or again that of substance: By substance, I mean that which is in itself and is conceived of by itself: that is, that whose concept does not need the concept of something else, from which it must be formed 2.

These two definitions are fundamental, because they define God for Spinoza. God is self-caused, and God is substance. More precisely, God alone is self-caused, and God alone is substance.

Among the axioms we find, for example, Given a determinate cause, an effect necessarily follows, and on the contrary, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow 3.

We can see that Spinoza is not merely defining the concept of cause here, but asserting a truth recognised as self-evident about the reality of the relationship between cause and effect.


Through this more geometrico argumentative structure, Spinoza advances step by step, deducing each proposition from the preceding ones.

For example, from Proposition 7: To the nature of substance belongs existence 4, and from Proposition 8: Any substance is necessarily infinite 5, Spinoza deduces Proposition 11:

God, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists 6.


Spinoza employs terms borrowed from Scholastic philosophy—substance, attribute, essence, etc.—but redefines them, giving them new meanings. Moreover, his application of the geometrical method to philosophy is a striking innovation.

More importantly, the conclusions he reaches in the Ethics are profoundly modern.

Indeed, God is infinite substance, of which everything else is merely an attribute. God is absolute perfection, from which all things proceed. Yet, in Book IV, almost incidentally, Spinoza reveals what he truly means by God: Nature itself.

He speaks of the very power of God, that is, of Nature 7 (Deus sive Natura).

In fact, if God is nothing other than Nature, then there is no God—at least not in the traditional sense. God is merely a name given to Nature, and there exists no transcendent (external and superior) deity beyond it.

Spinoza is thus one of the first philosophers of the 17th century to develop, albeit discreetly to avoid censorship, an atheism embedded at the very heart of his philosophy.


God, or in other words Nature, is defined as a substance with an infinity of attributes. Let us briefly clarify the traditional meaning of substance and attribute.

Consider a man. He is wealthy, tall, and famous. These determinations are attributes in the sense that they can change without affecting the underlying subject. This wealthy man may become poor, yet he remains the same individual. Attributes, therefore, are non-essential determinations of a person (or a thing)—characteristics that do not define its fundamental nature.

1 Ethics, Part I, def. 1
2 I, def. 3
3 I, axiom 3
4 Ibid.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 IV, prop. 4