Summary: The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (page 6)

The myth-making function of religion also combats the dissolving power of intelligence in two other ways.

First, intelligence makes us aware of the inevitability of death. To counterbalance the distress this awareness brings, religion presents us with the image of a continuation of life after death.

Second, we are conscious of the unpredictable and hazardous nature of certain actions—shooting an arrow at an animal, for instance. In response, we conceive of a god, an extra-mechanical guarantor of success ¹, one that favours the success of our endeavours.

Religion thus appears once again as a reaction against the dissolving power of intelligence—this time, against intelligence's representation of a discouraging margin of unpredictability between an initiative taken and the desired outcome ².

This reflex has faded in civilised societies, where determinism reigns. It is now assumed that all phenomena can be fully explained by natural causes, leaving no room for either God or chance in the analysis of events.

Primitive thought, however, does not recognise chance: if a stone falls and crushes a passer-by, it is because an evil spirit has thrown it.

From this example of the falling stone, Bergson derives his famous definition of chance:

Chance is therefore the mechanism behaving as if it had an intention ³.

It is a ghost of intention ⁴.

To clarify the function and nature of religion, Bergson contrasts it with magic. Both stem from a common premise—the idea that certain phenomena cannot be fully explained by the determinism of natural causes. They diverge, however, in that magic seeks to compel nature's consent ⁵, whereas religion implores the favour of God ⁶.

Magic stands in opposition to science as desire stands in opposition to will.

Religion is thus intended to ward off the dangers that intelligence might bring upon us ⁷. This, however, is only what Bergson calls static religion, suited only to closed societies. Religion cannot be entirely reduced to this single, infra-intellectual origin.

There exists a second origin of religion: dynamic religion.

Later, and through an effort that might never have occurred, man tore himself away from his circular motion; he reinserted himself into the evolutionary current, extending it. This was dynamic religion. ⁸

It is to this second, supra-intellectual form of religion that Bergson turns in the next chapter.

III/ Dynamic Religion

Dynamic religion is the religion of the mystic. It consists in a coincidence with the vital impulse—or more precisely: Man moves back in the direction from which the impulse originated, in order to regain its impetus. He gives himself to society, but to a society that encompasses humanity as a whole ⁹.

Bergson offers a more precise description of the élan vital:

[This] great current of creative energy [...] throws itself into matter to obtain what it can. At most points, it is stopped; these stops are reflected in our eyes as the appearances of so many living species ¹⁰.

Dynamic religion is mysticism. It is rare. It lies at the origin of Greek thought and is found in Orphism, Pythagoreanism, and Platonism. It is also present in Plotinus but, according to Bergson, lost in Aristotle.

Dialectic thus unfolds into mysticism: It was an extra-rational force that gave rise to this rational development and brought it to its conclusion, beyond reason ¹¹.

The culmination of mysticism is a coming into contact—and therefore a partial coincidence—with the creative effort manifested by life ¹².

Plotinus attained ecstasy but stopped too soon: at contemplation. He did not go as far as action—for him, action represents a weakening of contemplation ¹³, a view that sums up Greek intellectualism, which was never able to achieve complete mysticism.

¹ p.146
² ibid.
³ p.155
⁴ p.156
⁵ p.183
⁶ p.196
⁷ ibid.
⁸ chap.3, p.224
⁹ p.225
¹⁰ p.221
¹¹ p.232
¹² ibid.
¹³ p.233