Summary: The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (page 4)

This, according to Bergson, leads to a failure to grasp the radical newness and unpredictability of events.

It amounts to viewing time as movement in space—a straight line from point A to point B, where the point of arrival is assumed to exist virtually. In reality, it is only in retrospect, once point B has been reached, that we can say it was the goal of the movement. This is mistaken because, at any moment, events could have taken an entirely different turn (another point C could have been reached instead). Furthermore, point B cannot be reached by continuous movement but only by a leap. The new is therefore not contained as a virtual pre-existence within the old—which is precisely why it is... new.

In morality, the retrospective illusion consists in mistaking past forms of justice for partial glimpses of a perfect justice—our own.

This illusion also forms the background of many a philosophical problem, for which Zeno's dichotomy provided the model ¹.

When, then, is this societal leap towards a higher justice accomplished? As we have seen, it happens when a model—a hero—emerges:

This is a leap forward, which only occurs if society has decided to attempt an experiment. For this to happen, it must have allowed itself to be convinced or at least unsettled—and the impetus has always been given by someone ².

The hero's call resolves a paradox: absolute morality can only be realised within a society whose state of mind already reflects the very transformation it is meant to induce ³.

In other words, a democracy can only emerge if people's state of mind is already thoroughly democratic—yet such a state of mind seems to exist only within a democracy. Heroes break this cycle.

For social morality, the supreme good is the happiness of the greatest number. The famous question of sacrifice—are you willing to sacrifice one man for the happiness of many?—is answered in the affirmative.

For complete morality, the question does not even arise.

Bergson traces the history of this transition to a new form of justice: from the Jews, who gave legislation its imperious character, to Christianity, whose programme was later fulfilled by the French Revolution and the Puritans of America.

The impetus is therefore not Greek or Roman—even the Stoic Marcus Aurelius did not abolish slavery—but Judeo-Christian.

These two forms of morality intermingle in every society. One in which only a single form existed would, of course, never be found: Pure aspiration is an ideal limit, like naked obligation ⁴.

Bergson renews his critique of intellectualism, now targeting Kant specifically. For Kant, an action is moral when its maxim cannot be universally denied without contradiction. Bergson revisits the Kantian example of the monetary deposit: we are morally obliged to return a deposit to the person who entrusted it to us because, if we did not, and such behaviour became universal, no more deposits would be made.

This doctrine makes contradiction a founding element of morality. But the fact that moral conduct has a rational structure does not mean that morality has its origin or even its foundation in pure reason ⁵.

Reason is not binding, contrary to what intellectualism assumes. When philosophers argue that morality simply requires silencing egoism and passion, they unwittingly reveal—and we must congratulate them for this—that they have never heard either of these voices resound very loudly within themselves ⁶.

Reason, by itself, cannot posit or establish any ultimate end, whether it be social cohesion or human progress.

Having identified the two types of morality and their origins, Bergson now turns to religion. What, then, are the two sources of religion?

¹ p.72
² p.74
³ ibid.
⁴ p.85
⁵ p.86
⁶ p.88