Summary: The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (page 2)
While social morality is impersonal, absolute morality is embodied in an exceptional individual—such as the sages of Greece or the prophets of Israel.
In this sense, if social morality consists in universal acceptance of a law
1, absolute morality consists in common imitation of a model
2.
The transition to this second form of morality often arises from what Bergson calls "the call of the hero":
Why is it that great men have drawn crowds behind them? They ask for nothing, and yet they obtain. They have no need to exhort; they have only to exist; their existence is a call 3.
One might say that love for humanity lies at the origin of this second form of morality—but that remains too abstract and general.
It corresponds to a particular psychological disposition. In the case of social morality, we act in our own interest or in the collective interest, which indirectly serves our private interest. This is the mark of a soul closed in on itself.
The opposite attitude is that of the open soul. Strictly speaking, it does not seek the interest of others—since that would remain a form of calculation—but consists in the love of others.
As we have seen, social morality is founded on the power of habit. The force that renders the morality of humanity effective, by contrast, is sensibility, emotion, passion, and love.
Bergson engages in a critique of intellectualism, which regards emotion as secondary—merely a repercussion, in sensibility, of an intellectual representation.
He also demonstrates the existence of emotions that are not merely infra-intellectual (effects of ideas) but supra-intellectual—causes of ideas.
Emotion thus lies at the origin of great inventions. There is nothing shameful about it, and against the intelligence that critiques (reason?), we may set the intelligence that invents—one that consists precisely in emotion: Creation means, above all, emotion
4.
Curiosity, desire, and the anticipated joy of solving a problem are emotions, and they propel intelligence forward despite obstacles
5.
The same holds in literature and art: The most brilliant works often emerge from a singular emotion
6.
Bergson distinguishes between two ways of inventing.
Either intelligence is left to its own devices, in which case the mind works coldly, merely combining ideas that have long since been cast into words
7—nothing more than a rearrangement of old elements.
Or intelligence, consumed by the fire of an original and singular emotion
[is born] from a moment of coincidence between the author and his subject—that is, from an intuition
8.
This intuition, born from materials supplied by intelligence
, which is then in a molten state
, subsequently solidifies
into ideas and seeks to expand as best it can into multiple and shared concepts, already prefigured in words
9.
An emotion lies at the origin of absolute morality, which may then crystallise into one doctrine or another. No doctrine or theory, however, has any binding power: No speculation will create an obligation, or anything like it; no matter how beautiful the theory, I could always say I do not accept it
10. Whereas if emotion penetrates me, I will act in accordance with it, lifted by it
11.
A doctrine may convince the intellect, but not the will. Yet there is a long journey from intellectual assent to a true conversion of the will
12.
Social morality spreads through coercion or pressure. Complete morality works differently: In this case, one no longer yields to pressure but to attraction
13.
The first corresponds to a sense of satisfaction drawn from the normal functioning of life. The second refers—according to Bergson—to the enthusiasm of progress, a forward march in which there are no obstacles to overcome.
From this perspective, such a soul feels—rightly or wrongly—in harmony with the very principle of life
14: the élan vital (vital impulse), which likewise encounters no obstacles.
1 p.30
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 p.42
5 p.43
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 p.45
11 ibid.
12 p.46
13 ibid.
14 ibid., p.52