Summary: Nicomachean Ethics (page 4)

Every action brings with it either pleasure or pain. Morality does not lie in feeling neither pleasure nor pain, but in knowing how to respond to each appropriately and how much weight to give them in different situations: The person who knows how to handle these two feelings properly will be the good person; the one who mismanages them will be the vicious ¹.

Vice does not consist in merely having certain failings, but in taking pleasure in them.

Thus, we see the following principle emerge:

The goal that virtue sets for itself is, in fact, a state of moderation ² [...]; virtue is, therefore, a kind of mean ³.

It is worth noting that while there is only one way to be good, there are countless ways to go wrong ⁴.

Book III

Which actions deserve moral censure? A distinction must be drawn between voluntary and involuntary actions — those performed under compulsion or out of ignorance. But can the latter truly be condemned?

Suppose a master orders us to commit a shameful act by holding our family hostage. Should such an action be condemned?

Ignorant action is the mark of the vicious: Any perverse individual is ignorant of what should be done and what should be avoided ⁵. Such individuals deserve pity and forgiveness ⁶, since their actions are not voluntary.

It would be a mistake, however, to claim that actions performed out of anger or desire are involuntary. For, ultimately, every action we undertake is, in some sense, willed.

That which precedes the act is deliberation. We do not deliberate about everything: we do not deliberate about eternal facts (such as the movements of the planets) or matters of chance. We deliberate only about what depends on us and what we have the power to do ⁷. Moreover, we deliberate not about the ends to be pursued, but about the means of achieving them.

It is wrong to claim, as Socrates does, that no one is willingly wicked ⁸. Indeed, just as we are free to say 'no', we are equally free to say 'yes' ⁹. Thus, it is ultimately up to us whether we become virtuous or vicious ¹⁰.

Those who remain ignorant through negligence are culpable, for it was their responsibility to overcome their ignorance: no one is presumed ignorant of the law.

In Book IV, Aristotle examines various virtues: magnificence, magnanimity...

Book V

In this book, Aristotle focuses his examination on one particular virtue: justice. Indeed, justice encompasses all the other virtues ¹¹.

There are two forms of justice: distributive justice — the allocation of common resources according to a certain proportion — and corrective justice, which deals with punishments and penalties.

The law of retaliation is unjust, as it overlooks, for instance, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary wrongdoing.

The best rule of justice is that which accords with nature.

In Book VI, Aristotle examines the intellectual virtues, such as prudence — the art of deliberating well, or of knowing how to apply general principles to particular cases.

While Book VII is dedicated to the notion of pleasure, Book VIII explores the concept of friendship.

Friendship is a fundamental virtue, for without friends, no one would wish to live, even if they possessed all other goods ¹².

For Homer, friendship is two beings walking united ¹³.

Aristotle also investigates the relationship between justice and friendship:

If citizens were to practise friendship among themselves, they would have no need for justice at all [...] yet even if they were just, they would still need friendship ¹⁴.

Thus, when perfected, justice appears to take on the character of friendship ¹⁵.

¹ ibid.
² ibid.
³ I, 6
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid.
⁹ ibid.
¹⁰ ibid.