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Summary: Nicomachean Ethics (page 3)

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While Aristotle rejects the idea of a single, universal Good-in-itself, he does not, however, reject the idea of a Supreme Good.

This is that for the sake of which all else is done 1 — the ultimate goal in the hierarchy of ends. It is what we seek for its own sake, and never as a means to something further. As we have seen, this supreme good is happiness.


How can we attain happiness? By living in accordance with what is distinctive to human nature. A life of sensation, however, is not unique to human beings — it is shared with animals. What distinguishes human beings is reason, and with it, virtue: The proper of man is the activity of the soul in complete or partial accord with reason 2.

Thus, happiness is, as we see it, the activity of the soul guided by virtue 3.

Our initial question — "what is happiness?" — must now give way to another: what is virtue? Or, more practically, how can one become virtuous?


Aristotle emphasises that virtue exists only in action. One is virtuous only by acting in accordance with ethical principles, not merely by professing them:

Just as in the Olympic Games it is neither the most beautiful nor the strongest who win the crown, but only those who actually compete — so too, in life, it is those who act as they should who become the true possessors of the Beautiful and the Good 4.

Virtue, by its very nature, brings true pleasure 5, for no one can be truly good without experiencing joy in performing good deeds 6. As a result, virtuous people do not consider pleasure a mere accessory; they find pleasure in the virtuous life 7.

However, happiness cannot be achieved without external goods 8. Wealth is not incompatible with virtue but is, in fact, necessary for its practical realisation: It is impossible or at least difficult to act well if one is deprived of resources. For many actions require, as means of execution, friends, wealth, and a certain degree of political power 9.


Neither animals nor children can experience true happiness, for they either lack reason or have not yet learned to exercise it.

Should we wait for a man's death before determining whether his life was a happy one? No: happiness lies not in avoiding the blows of fate, but in facing them with wisdom: not out of insensitivity, but from generosity and greatness of soul 10.

Book II

Aristotle distinguishes between the intellectual virtues, which arise from instruction, and the moral virtues — daughters of good habits 11.


Virtue does not arise from nature: No moral virtue is innate within us 12. However, we are naturally predisposed to acquire them, provided we cultivate them through habit 13.

From nature, we receive only tendencies and potential dispositions, and it is then our task to actualise them through practice 14.

Hence the importance of will and of action: For example, it is by building that we become architects, and by playing the zither that we become musicians. Similarly, it is through practising justice, temperance, and courage that we become just, temperate, and brave 15.

It is by facing dangerous situations that we become courageous, or cowardly by repeatedly fleeing them.

We must, therefore, act with caution, as our actions shape our character. How we are raised in childhood is likewise of fundamental importance.


Here we encounter Aristotle's famous doctrine of the golden mean. An action is virtuous when it avoids both excess and deficiency.

The body can be harmed by both excess and deficiency of food or drink. Now it is the same with temperance, courage, and the other virtues 16.

So, for example, one who indulges in every kind of pleasure, denying themselves nothing, exhibits intemperance, while one who shuns all pleasures, like a boor, becomes dull and insensible 17.

We can likewise consider the example of courage, which lies between cowardice and recklessness — an excess of courage that leads one to act without reason.

1 ibid.
2 ibid.
3 I, 6
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 ibid.