Summary: Nicomachean Ethics (page 2)

Aristotle illustrates the extent of this disagreement: Some consider it to be an obvious and tangible good, such as pleasure, wealth, or honours; for others, the answer differs, and for the same individual, it often varies: for instance, when ill, one gives preference to health; when poor, to wealth ¹.

A science must be based on principles, on what is self-evident; and the principle, in this matter [ethics], is the fact ². It thus appears that Aristotle will draw on experience in his discussion of ethics.

Aristotle distinguishes three types of life: one directed towards pleasure — an existence akin to that of animals, and characteristic of the masses; another directed towards honours — the active political life pursued by those of distinction; and the third aims at contemplation.

Honours are not the true supreme good, as they are bestowed upon us in recognition of merit. Merit (virtue) is therefore superior to honours. Yet virtue is not the supreme good either, since even the virtuous person can endure great suffering — for instance, Socrates, who was condemned despite his virtues; it would be paradoxical to claim that one who suffers so profoundly possesses the supreme good.

Aristotle moves from received opinion to philosophy by examining Plato's doctrine of the Good-in-itself. Should this theory be accepted? Aristotle remains unconvinced — and in a phrase that has become famous, he asserts that one may have affection for friends and truth; but morality consists in giving preference to truth ³.

What prevents Aristotle from endorsing the Platonic notion of a single, universal Good-in-itself is that the good has as many categories as being ⁴.

In his work The Categories, Aristotle identifies several modes of being — substance, quantity, accident, and others.

In a similar manner, the good is expressed through essence, quality, and relation. Consequently, no single, common idea can be ascribed to these diverse categories ⁵.

Aristotle provides several examples:

As a substance, the supreme good is identified with God or with intellect; as a quality, it manifests as the virtues; as a quantity, as the just measure; as a relation, it appears as the useful; in time, as the opportune moment, and so forth ⁶.

The conclusion becomes clear: It is, therefore, evident that the good cannot be a single, common, and universal property ⁷.

If, on the other hand, there were a single, universal Good-in-itself, there would be a single science encompassing all goods. Yet, as we observe, there are several: strategy, medicine, or gymnastics — disciplines concerned with what is good in matters of war, health, or physical training.

The Good-in-itself is, ultimately, nothing other than the good. The Platonic notion of "in itself" is empty: Man-in-itself and an individual man share one and the same definition: that of man. If this holds true for man, it must also hold true for the good ⁸.

The Platonic Good is eternal — certainly, but the fact that the good is eternal will not enhance its essence, just as the whiteness of an object will not be intensified if that object endures longer than another that remains white for only a single day ⁹.

The Idea of the Good-in-itself ultimately appears to be of no practical use:

It is rather puzzling to determine what practical benefit a weaver or a carpenter might derive from knowing this Good-in-itself, or how the contemplation of this idea might assist the practice of medicine or strategy ¹⁰.

Here, Aristotle continues his critique of the Platonic theory of Ideas — one he had already pursued in works such as The Metaphysics.

¹ ibid.
² ibid.
³ I, 6
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid.
⁹ ibid.
¹⁰ ibid.