Summary: Republic (page 4)

Adeimantus raises an objection: not only does the philosopher seem useless to the city, but we also observe that those who remain devoted to philosophy most often become rather eccentric characters, not to say quite perverse ¹.

Socrates replies that the treatment states give to their wisest men is so harsh that no one in the world suffers worse ².

To illustrate his point, he uses a metaphor. Imagine a ship whose crew are fighting over the helm, while the captain has no knowledge of navigation. Worse still, the crew themselves have no grasp of seamanship either, yet insist that it is not an art that can be learned ³ (Here, Plato is taking aim at the Athenians, who refused to acknowledge politics as a genuine science).

These sailors, drunk and unruly, seize the helm and navigate as such men ⁴—steering the ship to ruin. Plato is alluding here to the demagogues, the mob-leaders who bring about the downfall of the state.

Yet there is indeed an art to governing: They do not even suspect that the true pilot must study the weather, the seasons, the sky, the stars ⁵. On this ship, any pilot who tried to reason with the rest of the crew would be branded by the deckhands as a lazy man, a vain talker, and a good-for-nothing ⁶. The philosopher's lot in the city is no different. He remains useless to it—not because he lacks worth, but because he is never put to use.

Why then does he become "perverse," to use Adeimantus' word? Precisely because of his uselessness. Just as any plant placed in the wrong climate degenerates, so too does an excellent nature, when subjected to an unfavourable regime, become worse than a mediocre one ⁷.

Now suppose one of the crewmen flatters the other sailors, calling their ignorance "wisdom" and their rambling opinions about steering the ship a form of knowledge.

This is the sophist, who, unlike the philosopher, teaches no maxims other than those already professed by the people in their assemblies—and this they call wisdom ⁸.

Plato's conclusion is stark: It is impossible for the people to be philosophers, and inevitable that they should blame philosophers ⁹.

No existing government is suited to the philosophical character. Philosophy therefore becomes corrupted, like a seed fallen on barren soil. Yet if it were to encounter a government whose excellence matched its own, it would be seen to be truly divine ¹⁰—and that government is precisely the one Plato describes in The Republic: the government of the ideal city.

The realisation of this perfect government will be possible only by gradually winning the people over to its programme.

What, then, is the knowledge available to the philosopher, by which he can legitimately claim power? It is the highest science—the science of the Idea of the Good:

The Idea of the Good is the highest form of knowledge, that from which justice and the other virtues derive their usefulness and benefits ¹¹.

We are insufficiently acquainted with this Idea, and as a result, all other knowledge is of no benefit to us. For it is useless to possess many things if they are not good, or to know everything except the good, and thus to know nothing beautiful or good ¹².

Good does not consist in pleasure, as most men believe, for there are such things as evil pleasures.

Thus, in this book of The Republic, Plato poses the question: what is the nature of the good? That is the problem he now sets out to examine.

¹ 487b-488b
² ibid.
³ 488b-489c
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ 491c-492c
⁸ 492c-493c
⁹ 493c-494c
¹⁰ 496c-497c
¹¹ 504d-505c
¹² Ibid.