

Summary: Twilight of the Idols
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche develops a critique of Plato and the moral equation good = beautiful = true.
He argues that morality conceals a disguised form of nihilism. The death of Socrates is evidence of this—or rather, a symptom: Socrates wanted to die.
Religion also masks an underlying nihilism, as does rationalism, which rejects becoming.
It is in the Twilight of the Idols that Nietzsche proposes a transvaluation of all values: this question mark so black, so enormous [...]
1.
His aim is to unmask idols, that is, false gods. Socrates and Wagner are two prime examples.
Nietzsche examines Socrates—and, through him, Platonic philosophy—from a novel perspective: that of the body. The question is not whether their ideas are true or false, but whether they express a state of bodily health or a weakening, a decadence.
Nietzsche's idea is that a weakening of the body—an illness, an impotence—can be the source of a masked nihilism, which would find its echo in Platonic thought.
Nietzsche notes that Socrates, at the moment of his death, asks that a cock be sacrificed to Asclepius, the god of medicine. From this, he deduces that Socrates regarded life as an illness and that the god of medicine should be thanked when he was about to be freed from it.
Nietzsche thus seeks to show that behind the Platonic equation good = beautiful = true lies a profound nihilism, a desire for death:
Ever since time immemorial, the wise have passed the same judgment on life: it is worthless... There must be something sick here 2.
Thus, it is no longer a matter of examining the truth of Platonic thought but of considering it as a symptom—a symptom of an illness: Judgements about life can never be true: they have no value other than that of being symptoms. In themselves, such judgements are stupidities
3.
Life is tragic, whether because of its lack of meaning or the painful events that befall us. Yet, rather than acknowledging this reality and its tragic nature—which would be the healthy reaction—some seek to flee from it.
So they invent backworlds
, alternative realities: from the Platonic realm of Ideas to the Christian paradise. It is in this second reality that happiness will finally be attained. Yet, this escape from the world into another, illusory world—one that does not exist—is the very expression of a deep nihilism: an abandonment of the enjoyment of this world and of the struggle at its heart.
This flight is, at the same time, an inappropriate defensive reaction to the tragic nature of this world. Nietzsche uses the medical term idiosyncrasy to designate this defence mechanism.
Morality is a defensive reaction born of impotence:
The worm recoils when you step on it. This is full of wisdom. By doing so, it lessens the chance of being stepped on again. In the language of morality: humility 4.
Socrates was aware of the nihilism at work within him. Nietzsche recounts the anecdote of a physiognomist who told Socrates that he was a monster, hiding within himself all vices. This provoked laughter among those around him, who held Socrates up as a model of virtue. But Socrates simply replied: You know me, sir!
5.
For Nietzsche, this was not an instance of the famous Socratic irony but a moment of sincerity in which Socrates confessed the evil that was consuming him.
This nihilism reverses values. Socrates invents the dialectic—the reasoning that seeks to demonstrate a theory. Yet what must be demonstrated in order to be believed is worth little
6.
The thoughts that imposed themselves by their natural beauty, their own authority, are driven out by vulgar ideas carried by demonstrations. This is the end of the aristocratic ideal: First and foremost, it is a distinguished taste that is defeated; with dialectic, the people manage to get the upper hand
.
While everywhere
authority remains in fashion, wherever people do not reason but command, the dialectician is a kind of bungler: he is laughed at, not taken seriously. Socrates was the bungler who was taken seriously
7.
1 Le Crépuscule des Idoles, GF-Flammarion, Paris, 1985, trad. H. Albert, p.69
2 p.81
3 p.82
4 p.76
5 p.83
6 p.84
7ibid.