Summary: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology

I. The Crisis of the Sciences as an Expression of the Radical Crisis of Life in European Humanity

Is there truly a crisis in the sciences? Has their scientific validity been called into question?

What is certain is that, when Husserl wrote this work, philosophy appeared to be in crisis, in danger of lapsing into scepticism, irrationalism, or mysticism.

But what about the positive sciences? They do not seem to be in crisis, as they were producing remarkable results at the time. The same could be said of the human sciences: The contrast between the scientific status of these disciplines and, conversely, the lack of scientific status of philosophy cannot be ignored ¹.

However, if we take seriously the concerns thrown up by the crisis of our culture and consider the role attributed to the sciences within this crisis, might we then find sufficient reason to subject the scientific credentials of all the sciences to serious scrutiny—while still acknowledging the unassailable rigour of their methodological approach (which constitutes their scientific status in the first sense)? ²

Indeed, we will see that the crisis of philosophy ultimately leads back to the crisis of the modern sciences, including the mathematical sciences.

To begin with, Husserl observes a shift in the way the sciences were regarded towards the end of the nineteenth century. This shift did not concern their scientific status, but rather what science, in general, had meant—and could still mean—for human existence ³.

Husserl notes that the positive sciences have shaped our overall conception of the world. As a result, we have turned away, with indifference, from the very questions that are decisive for an authentic humanity ⁴.

In fact, mere de facto sciences give rise to a mere de facto humanity ⁵.

Husserl puts it this way:

In the distress of our lives, this science has nothing to tell us. The very questions it excludes on principle are precisely those that weigh most heavily on our troubled age, for a humanity abandoned to the upheavals of fate: these are the questions that concern the meaning—or lack of meaning—of all human existence ⁶.

According to Husserl, it is essential to provide a rational ⁷ answer to these questions.

Finally, what does science have to tell us about ourselves as human beings and subjects of freedom?

Natural science, which deals with physical bodies, has nothing to say about this matter, as it abstracts from everything subjective ⁸.

On the other hand, the human sciences, which deal with human beings, must exclude from consideration any axiological stance—that is, any value judgement. Scientific, objective truth consists exclusively in observing what the physical and spiritual world in fact is ⁹. But is it possible for the world and human beings to have any real meaning if the sciences allow only this kind of objectivity to be asserted as true?

For example, history, when approached scientifically, seems to teach us that rules of life, ideals, and norms arise like fleeting waves, only to dissolve as quickly; that reason will always revert to unreason, and that benefits will always turn into plagues ¹⁰.

It is worth noting that the ideal of positivist objectivity has not always prevailed.

In the past, science could still claim significance for European humanity. Why has this changed? Why this positivist turn?

A fundamental shift took place during the Renaissance: the medieval way of life fell into disrepute. Ancient civilisation was admired, and people sought to emulate it. What was pursued in this imitation was a philosophical form ¹¹ of existence—in other words, freely fashioning, from pure reason alone, a rule to govern one's entire life.

¹ La crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, trad. G. Granet, I,1, p.9
² I,2,p.9
³ ibid., p.10
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid., p.10-11
⁹ ibid., p.11
¹⁰ ibid.
¹¹ I,3, p.12