Summary: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology

I. The Crisis of the Sciences as an Expression of the Radical Crisis of Life in European Humanity

Is there truly a crisis in the sciences? Has their scientific validity become questionable?

What is certain is that, at the time Husserl wrote this work, philosophy appeared to be in crisis, at risk of falling into scepticism, irrationalism, or mysticism.

But what about the positive sciences? They do not seem to be in crisis, as they were producing remarkable results when Husserl was writing. The same applies to the sciences of the mind: The contrast between the scientificity of these disciplines and, conversely, the non-scientificity of philosophy cannot be ignored ¹.

However, if we heed the concerns raised by the crisis of our culture and consider the role attributed to the sciences within this crisis, might we then find sufficient reason to subject the scientificity of all sciences to serious scrutiny—while still acknowledging the unassailable rigour of their methodological approach (which constitutes their scientificity in the first sense)? ²

Indeed, we shall see that the crisis of philosophy ultimately leads back to the crisis of the modern sciences, including the mathematical sciences.

To begin with, Husserl observes a reversal in the way the sciences were esteemed towards the end of the nineteenth century. This shift did not concern their scientificity, but rather what science, in general, had meant—and could still mean—for human existence ³.

Husserl notes that the positive sciences have shaped our overall conception of the world. As a result, we have turned away, with indifference, from the very questions that are decisive for an authentic humanity ⁴.

In fact, mere de facto sciences give rise to a mere de facto humanity ⁵.

Husserl puts it this way:

In the distress of our lives, this science has nothing to tell us. The very questions it excludes on principle are precisely those that burn most intensely in our unhappy age, for a humanity abandoned to the upheavals of fate: these are the questions that concern the meaning—or lack of meaning—of all human existence ⁶.

According to Husserl, it is essential to provide a rational ⁷ answer to these questions.

Finally, what does science have to tell us about ourselves, as human beings and subjects of freedom?

First of all, the natural science of bodies has nothing to say on this matter, as it abstracts from everything subjective ⁸.

On the other hand, the sciences of the mind, which deal with human beings, must exclude from consideration any axiological stance—that is, anything concerning values. Scientific, objective truth consists exclusively in the observation of what the physical and spiritual world is in fact ⁹. But is it possible for the world and the human being to have any real meaning if the sciences allow only this kind of objectivity to be asserted as true?.

For example, history, when considered in its scientific approach, seems to teach us that rules of life, ideals, and norms arise like fleeting waves and, like them, dissolve; that reason will always revert to unreason, and that benefits will always turn into plagues ¹⁰.

It should be noted that the ideal of positivist objectivity has not always prevailed.

In the past, science could still claim significance for European humanity. Why has this changed? Why this positivist turn?

A fundamental shift took place during the Renaissance: the mode of existence of the Middle Ages was devalued. Ancient humanity was admired, and people sought to emulate it. What was pursued in this imitation was the philosophical form ¹¹ of existence—in other words, the act of freely giving oneself a rule, drawn from pure reason, to govern one's entire life.

¹ La crise des sciences européennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, trad. G. Granet, I,1, p.9
² I,2,p.9
³ ibid., p.10
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid., p.10-11
⁹ ibid., p.11
¹⁰ ibid.
¹¹ I,3, p.12