Summary: The Philosophy of No (page 3)

The difference between the two forms of rationalism (simple and dialectical) can be understood as follows: while the former corresponds to a philosophy of "as if", dialectical rationalism, or surrationalism, corresponds to a philosophy of "why not": why shouldn’t mass be negative? This is where the scientific dream is born: what could a negative mass correspond to?

Bachelard can now explain in greater detail what the "Philosophy of No" entails. It is an unceasing polemical activity of reason, which keeps acquired results under continuous discussion. It is this process that leads the mind to adopt, then reject, the various epistemological approaches described above in order to advance our understanding of a concept.

The Philosophy of No is therefore essentially constructive, contrary to what its name might suggest: The Philosophy of No is not a mere desire for negation ¹. It does not contradict without proof, does not shun all rules, does not accept internal contradiction, and does not deny anything arbitrarily or without reason.

It differs from Hegelian dialectics in that it is experimental, whereas the Hegelian notion of overcoming, for Bachelard, remains trapped in the a priori.

Surrationalism profoundly renews our understanding of the world:

A single dialecticised axiom is enough to make all of nature sing ².

Surrationalism, in a sense, determines a surobject—which is the result of critical objectification, of an objectivity that retains from the object only what it has criticised ³.

An example of a surobject is the atom, as it appears in contemporary microphysics.

We note that as progress rises from animism to dialectical rationalism, immediate intuition is not a source of truth but a source of errors, destined to be corrected: Intuitions are very useful: they serve to be destroyed ⁴.

Or again: In all circumstances, the immediate must give way to the constructed ⁵.

Bachelard re-establishes the relationship between science and reason. Philosophers might indeed be tempted (as is often evident in their epistemological doctrines) to dictate how science should proceed—based on their metaphysical conception of the world.

For Bachelard, the opposite is true: Science instructs reason. Reason must obey science—the most advanced science, the evolving science ⁶.

We must guard against the reflex, common among authors of philosophical systems, of dismissing an experience that fails to accord with their system, often constructed a priori: Reason has no right to overemphasise an immediate experience; on the contrary, it must place itself in balance with the most richly structured experience ⁷.

So, if arithmetic were to prove contradictory, we would not abandon the discipline—for it is too useful and has provided too much evidence of accuracy. Instead, we would reform our reason—that is, develop an epistemological conception that allows for and integrates contradiction.

In reality, arithmetic is not founded on reason. It is the doctrine of reason that is founded on elementary arithmetic ⁸. The mind must bend to the conditions of knowledge, not the other way round.

Thus, the philosophy of science must listen to the sciences and their progress, rather than seek to guide them from an elaborate conception a priori:

Reason must obey science. Geometry, physics, and arithmetic are sciences; the traditional doctrine of an absolute and immutable reason is merely a philosophy. It is an outdated philosophy ⁹.

¹ chap.6, p.135
² ibid., p.138
³ ibid., p.139.
⁴ ibid.
⁵ ibid., p.144
⁶ ibid.
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid.
⁹ ibid., p.145